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ABSTRACT
Data ownership and data protection are increasingly important top-
ics with ethical and legal implications, e.g., with the right to erasure
established in the European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). In this light, we investigate network embeddings, i.e., the
representation of network nodes as low-dimensional vectors. We
consider a typical social network scenario with nodes representing
users and edges relationships between them. We assume that a net-
work embedding of the nodes has been trained. After that, a user
demands the removal of his data, requiring the full deletion of the
corresponding network information, in particular the correspond-
ing node and incident edges. In that setting, we analyze whether
after the removal of the node from the network and the deletion of
the vector representation of the respective node in the embedding
significant information about the link structure of the removed node
is still encoded in the embedding vectors of the remaining nodes.
If so, this would require a (potentially computationally expensive)
retraining of the embedding. For that purpose, we deploy an attack
that leverages information from the remaining network and embed-
ding to recover information about the neighbors of the removed
node. The attack is based on (i) measuring distance changes in
network embeddings and (ii) a machine learning classifier that is
trained on networks that are constructed by removing additional
nodes. Our experiments demonstrate that substantial information
about the edges of a removed node/user can be retrieved across
many different datasets. This implies that to fully protect the pri-
vacy of users, node deletion requires complete retraining –or at
least a significant modification– of original network embeddings.
Our results suggest that deleting the corresponding vector represen-
tation from network embeddings alone is not a sufficient measure
from a privacy perspective.
1 INTRODUCTION
Network embeddings, i.e., the representation of network nodes as
low-dimensional vectors, are a key technique of many state-of-the-
art solutions for a broad range of social network analysis tasks such
as link prediction [15, 18], node classification [4], or community
detection [7]. Since embedding calculation is often computationally
expensive, recalculation after every change in a social network is
not feasible for very large networks. At the same time, data own-
ership and data protection become increasingly important topics
for social media and social network applications. For example, the
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) establishes a
right to erasure, meaning that a data-holder is obligated to remove
all personal data of an individual if requested. Previous work has
demonstrated that machine learning models can leak information
about the training data [22, 25, 29]. Similarly, network embeddings
might open up the potential for residual personal data to remain in
a system while explicit data regarding a user has been deleted.
Research goal. We consequently investigate in this work the
possibility of recovering private information from social network
Figure 1: Scenario evaluated in this paper. Given a social
network and a low dimensional node embedding on that
network, a user demands the deletion of his account. Can
her neighborhood structure be restored from the embedding
vectors of the remaining nodes?
embeddings. Specifically, we analyze the following scenario (il-
lustrated in Figure 1): We assume a social network with users as
nodes and friendship relations as edges. On that network, an embed-
ding with low-dimensional vector representations has been trained
with a standard embedding algorithm (such as node2vec [10] or
HOPE [21]), e.g., to recommend new friends. Now, one specific user
deletes his account and requests the removal of his data, legally
requiring the platform to delete all data on this user. In that setting,
we study if the removal of the node from the network and deletion
of the vector of the respective node is sufficient from a privacy per-
spective, or if significant neighborhood information of the removed
node is still encoded in the embedding vectors of the remaining
nodes, and a (potentially computationally expensive) retraining or
modification of the embedding is required.
Approach. We develop a method1 to extract link information
about a removed user node from the embedding vectors of the
other nodes: Specifically, we train a new embedding E ′ on the
remaining network without the removed node and calculate pair-
wise differences in node similarities to the original embedding E.
These differences are used by a classifier to predict the neighbors
of the removed user node. To train this classifier, we artificially
remove additional nodes from the network, compute the respective
embeddings E ′′, and compare them with the embedding E ′.
Contribution and findings. Our experiments demonstrate that
substantial information about the edges of a removed node/user
are leaked. For example, on a sample of a Facebook network, our
method achieves an area under the ROC curve (AUC) score of
0.72 and a precision@10 of 0.41 when a node2vec embedding is
used, and an AUC of 0.91 and a precision@10 of 0.6 when a HOPE
embedding [21] is utilized. This implies that to fully protect the
privacy of users, node deletion requires complete retraining – or at
least a significant modification – of the network embeddings.
1Code available at https://github.com/embedding-attack/embAttack
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2 RELATEDWORK
Next, we discuss existing literature related to our work, in particu-
lar, network embeddings, link prediction, and privacy attacks on
machine learning models.
Network embeddings. Network embeddings recently received
strong attention from the research community due to their excel-
lent performance for practical applications such as link prediction,
node classification, visualization, clustering, or community detec-
tion. Thus, a large range of methods for the calculation of network
embeddings has been proposed in literature including factorization-
based methods [2, 20, 33], random walk-based methods [10, 17, 24],
or Convolutional Neural Networks [13, 19]. Although the perfor-
mance of our approach might vary, it is, in principle, agnostic to
the algorithms used for training the embedding. Thus, we do not
elaborate further on the specifics of those approaches but refer to
recent surveys on the topic [5, 9].
Link prediction. One specific application area of social network
analysis is link prediction, i.e., the prediction of missing links be-
tween nodes in a network or these that are likely to occur in the
future or were removed. See [18, 31] for an overview. Predicting
links to a specific node can be used to identify private information
in anonymized networks (e.g., [6, 35]). However, in link prediction
typically information on the current network structure and/or on
attributes of nodes (for which links are to be predicted) are ex-
ploited. Neither is available in our scenario for the removed node
as we assume this information to be completely removed from the
data. Thus, standard link prediction methods such as similarity-
based methods [14], stochastic block models [32], or Probabilistic
Entity-Relationship Models [12] cannot be applied.
Privacy attacks onmachine learningmodels.Due to increased
overall awareness of privacy issues, the susceptibility of machine
learning models to the extraction of personal information has come
into the scope of the research community (e.g., [29]).
In that regard, one key attack type is model inversion attacks.
Here, given a traditional machine learning model (e.g., a classifier
on tabular data), an adversary tries to infer values of sensitive at-
tributes in the training data. Generally, attack scenarios can be
divided into two variations [22]:White-box attacks (e.g., [1]) where
the adversary has access to information about the model architec-
ture and/or parameters, and black-box attacks where the adversary
does not have access to properties of the model. Black-box attacks
are more common and relevant in terms of data privacy. In most
scenarios, the adversary can use the model, i.e., apply inputs to the
model and observe corresponding outputs (e.g.,machine learning as
a service offers). Many approaches evaluate different inputs to the
model on how likely they are part of the training data. If the input
space is small enough, all possible inputs can be tested, for larger
input spaces (domain-specific) gradient descent based approaches
can be used [8].
Attacks to detect if an input for a machine learning model was
used during training are often referred to as membership inference
attacks [25, 26, 28]. The basic idea is to extract differences in the
confidences of the outputs for data used during training and data
that was not used. Advanced techniques, therefore, train shadow
models, which imitate the attacked model, on different generated
training datasets. An attack classifier is trained on data from these
shadow models and is applied to data of the attacked machine
learning model to achieve the attack’s goal. We see the privacy
attack on network embeddings proposed in this work as the transfer
of this general idea to the setting of network embeddings.
3 APPROACH
This section describes the proposed method. First, we formally
define the problem and then describe the main approach. In the last
part, we introduce a variation to the approach.
3.1 Problem Definition
In our scenario, we assume G = (V ,E) to be an undirected, un-
weighted, and connected network of nodes V (e.g., persons in a
social network) and edges E (e.g., friendship links between these
persons) that is stored, controlled, and used by a specific data owner.
Since persons often have unique friendship networks, the links in
a social network can potentially identify a person and should be
considered personal information. We assume that (to improve of-
fered services) the data owner computed a network embedding
E(G) of the network nodes, i.e., a mapping of each node to a fixed-
dimensional vector of d (e.g., d = 128) real numbers2. Our prob-
lem scenario (and attack approach) is in principle agnostic to the
employed embedding algorithm, and we will use a variety of dif-
ferent state-of-the-art embedding algorithms such as LINE [27],
node2vec [10], HOPE [21] and SDNE [30] in our evaluation.
Further, we assume that on request of the respective user, the
node vi (with all incident edges) is removed from the network and
the vector corresponding to this node is removed from the embed-
ding E(G). We denote the remaining network as G ′ = G/{vi } =(V /{vi },E/{{vi ,vj } |vj ∈V }) and the embedding without the vector
representation of that node as E/{vi } = E(G)/{vi } . Note that the
embedding E/{vi } has not been obtained by complete retraining,
which might be computationally expensive or even unfeasible for
each change in the network. Thus, it does not contain explicit in-
formation on vi anymore, but implicit information may still be
contained via embedding vectors of other nodes that have been
influenced by previously existing links with node vi .
In this work, we investigate if an attacker (adversary) can recover
information of the removed node vi by using the embedding of
the remaining nodes and their network structure. The target is to
predict incident edges (i.e., neighbors) of vi in G. In particular, we
will introduce and develop an attack algorithm A that predicts the
neighbors of vi in G. Formally, A(G ′, E/{vi }) 7→ NG (vi ), whereNG (vi ) = {vj |{vi ,vj } ∈ E} denotes the neighbors of vi . If able to
do so, we show the general susceptibility of network embeddings
to privacy attacks. We assume that the embedding algorithm and
parametrization of the algorithm are known to the attacker (“open
code – closed data” ), see also Section 6.
3.2 Privacy Attack
Next, we describe our approach of recovering edge information of
a deleted node vi . The main idea is to develop an attack classifier
that predicts for each node if it was connected to the removed node
2Note that we use the term network embedding to denote a vector representation of
each node of a network, not of the network itself as custom in conflicting terminology
in literature
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Figure 2: Approach of the proposed attack.
vi based on the differences in pairwise cosine distances of nodes
between the original embedding E/{vi } and a new embedding cal-
culated on the network of the remaining nodes. To create training
data for learning which distances are predictive for neighborhood
with the removed node, we monitor the effects of removing ad-
ditional nodes from the network. In detail, we proceed with the
following steps, see Figure 2 for a visualization:
(1) We start by computing a new embedding E ′ on the reduced
network G ′ with the same algorithm and parametrization as
the original one.
(2) From this embedding and the available embedding of the origi-
nal network E/{vi } , we calculate respective distance matrices
∆/{vi } and ∆
′ that contain the pairwise distance between each
node pair.
(3) Next, we calculate the changes in distances between these two
embeddings by calculating the (element-wise) difference matrix:
Diff(E/{vi }, E ′) = ∆/{vi } − ∆′. Thus, each element diff k,l in
Diff(E/{vi }, E ′) describes the changes of the distance between
nodes vk and vl from the original embedding E/{vi } to the
embedding of the remaining network E ′. Note that diff k,l =
diff l,k due to symmetry.
Since most embeddings encode in some way a local neighbor-
hood structure, intuitively nodes that exhibit many or large
changes in the embedding distance are more likely to be close
to the removed node. Initial experiments showed that this holds
as a general trend, but a simple summation of taking maximum
values is insufficient for a detailed prediction. Therefore, we use
a machine learning approach to identify which distance changes
are indicative for a node being a neighbor of the removed node.
(4) As a pre-requisite for a machine learning approach, we con-
struct a feature vector fk for each node vk ∈ G ′ that charac-
terizes the distribution of distance changes for this node in a
histogram-like fashion. For that purpose, we split the range
of all values in the full matrix Diff(E/{vi }, E ′) (excluding the
diagonal) by equal frequency discretization, i.e., we create bins
b1, ...,bm that contain the same number of values.
We now take the distance changes of vk to all other nodes
{diff k,l |vl ∈ G ′,vl , vk }. For each bin, the number of these
distance changes that lie within the bin then defines one node
feature of feature vector fk . We normalize these features over
all bins. As an additional feature, we append the degree of vk
in G ′, which is normalized over all features.
(5) Next, we create a training set to learn which features and feature
combinations predict that a node was a neighbor of the removed
node. For that purpose, we (temporarily) remove a second node
vj from G ′ to obtain a network G ′′ = G ′/{vj } and compute
the corresponding embedding E ′′. Then we can compare the
distance changes Diff(E ′/{vj }, E ′′) between the embeddings
E ′/{vj } and E ′′ and generate node features f for these changes
following steps (2)-(4). Additionally, for each node vk , we can
set a labelyk that indicates if the respective node was a neighbor
of the removed node vj inG ′. To obtain more training data, we
can repeat this process for each node vj ∈ G ′ as a node to be
removed from G ′.
(6) Following that, we train a machine learning classifier with the
data obtained in the last step, predicting the label yk (was a
node a neighbor of the removed node) based on the features
vector fk (with the distribution of distance changes and the
degree) of the node vk in G ′′. The intuition is that the changes
for removing the second node in the network will lead to similar
changes in the embedding distances compared to the changes
induced by removing the first node vi .
(7) Finally, we use this classifier on the training features obtained
from the network G ′ and embedding E/{vi } to predict which
nodes have been neighboring the removed node in the original
network, i.e., which links the removed node had.
3.3 Variation of the Privacy Attack
In addition to the previously described approach, we also exper-
iment with a variation. This variation aims to tackle the main
challenge of the attack: Since most state-of-the-art embedding al-
gorithms are based on approximate solutions to an optimization
function (e.g., via gradient descent), the outcome of an embedding
algorithm is not deterministic but varies to some degree even if the
same algorithm is used on the exact same data. Thus, a part of the
differences that we encounter when comparing embeddings of two
different networks is only due to instabilities in the embeddings
and not due to changes in the network.
The variation attempts to reduce the effect of those instabili-
ties. To compute attack features, we calculate a number of em-
beddings (E′1, ...,E
′
m ) on the available network G ′. From those
embeddings, we choose only the one most similar to the available
embedding of the attacked network E/{vi } for the computation
of attack features. As distance measure between the embeddings
we use the absolute sum over all values in the difference matrix
d(E/{vi }, E
′
k ) = sum(abs(Diff(E/{vi }, E
′
k ))). The idea of this dis-
tance measure is that most node distances in the original embedding
should be very similar to the node distances in the reduced embed-
ding as the underlying networks only differ by one node. Training
data is generated analogously, where the chosen embedding for
the computation of attack features E ′ is used for training feature
computations.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section describes the general experimental approach, including
parameter settings and evaluation criteria, as well as datasets and
embedding algorithms used in the evaluation.
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4.1 Experimental Approach
To simulate an attack scenario, we compute an embedding on the
original network G and then remove a node vi from the network
and its corresponding vector from the embedding. The network
without the removed nodeG/{vi } = G
′ and the embedding without
the removed node E(G)/{vi } = E/{vi } is then given as information
for the attack. Results are evaluated using neighbors of vi in G . On
all datasets, we perform 15 attacks, each with a different removed
node vi . Since the degree of a node has a significant effect on the
performance of the attack (see Section 5.2.3), we sample 5 nodes
with low degrees (i. e. with degrees close to the minimum degree,
usually 1), 5 with medium degrees, and 5 nodes with high degrees.
Each experiment is repeated 5 times on the same network and
removed node, but with different embedding runs. Since the stan-
dard error over these repetitions is mostly < 0.01 and consistently
< 0.05 for the reported measures, we only report mean values of
the outcomes for conciseness. Experiments on the variation use the
same embeddings on the available networks G ′ and G ′′ for each
iteration to decrease computational efforts.
Parameter Settings. If not otherwise mentioned, we use 10 dif-
ferent training networks G ′′ for each attack and use 10 bins for
the creation of features, see also Section 5.3 for an evaluation of
parameter sensitivity. We further compare several different clas-
sifiers: K-nearest neighbor, support vector machines, decision trees,
random forests, AdaBoost using decision trees, and Gaussian naive
Bayes. We use standard parametrizations of the scikit-learn python
package [23]. In most experiments we utilize the Gaussian naive
Bayes classifier due to its solid performance, see also Section 5.3.3.
Evaluation measures. In terms of evaluation measures, we treat
our setting as a (link) prediction problem and use established mea-
sures for this task. In particular, we employ the area under the ROC
curve (AUC) of the prediction of neighbors to the removed node,
the precision@10, (i.e., the precision among the 10 candidates with
the highest predicted likelihood of being a neighbor of the removed
node), as well as the F1-score of the prediction. For the F1-score, we
distinguish between averaging over all attack scenarios (Macro-F1)
and over (to predict) incident edges of the removed nodes in all
scenarios (Micro-F1).
4.2 Data
We evaluate the proposed attack on several artificial and real-world
networks. Due to resource limitations, we only conducted experi-
ments on networks of 1000 to 2000 nodes, see also Section 6. For
larger networks, we use snowball sampling to extract subnetworks
with 2000 nodes3. In terms of datasets, we test our approach on a
mix of synthetic and real-world networks:
Barabasi. To generate synthetic datasets, we use the well-known
Barabasi-Albert model [3] for scale-free networks. The model has
parameters to modify the number of nodes in the network and
the number of edges relative to the number of nodes (parameter of
attachment) that control network size and density. Unless otherwise
mentioned, we use a generated network with 1000 nodes and a
parameter of attachment of 5, which we refer to as Barabasi.
3Samples are available at https://github.com/embedding-attack/embAttack
Facebook. This network is a subset of the friendship network of
Facebook4. A node represents a user and an edge between two
nodes represents a friendship between the users. We use snowball
sampling to sample a network with 2000 nodes and 14251 edges.
Hamsterster. Hamsterster was a social network for people who
like hamsters5. It operated for 10 years but is shut down now. We
use the biggest connected component of this network, which has
1788 nodes and 12476 edges.
DBLP. This network is a collaboration network extracted from the
DBLP computer science bibliography [34]. Nodes correspond to
authors. Two nodes are connected if the two authors collaborated
in at least one paper. The used network is snowball sampled. It has
2000 nodes and 7036 edges.
4.3 Embedding Algorithms
We evaluate our attack on four embedding algorithms that we con-
sider as representatives for some fundamental variations of com-
puting network embeddings: HOPE [21] embeds the neighborhood
structure for each node using the Katz index. LINE [27] embeds
the local and global neighborhood structures separately and com-
bines the resulting embeddings. node2vec [10] applies the word
embedding algorithm word2vec on random walks generated from
the network. The Structural Deep Network Embedding (SDNE) [30]
computes embeddings based on the encoder-decoder principle.
Among those algorithms, two focus on global neighborhood struc-
ture (HOPE and SDNE with a low alpha parameter), while the two
others (LINE and node2vec) balance embedding local and global
neighborhoods. Additionally, HOPE appears to yield near-constant
embeddings, while the other algorithms display significant instabil-
ity (that is, variations in the embeddings between algorithm runs
on the same data).
To enable an unbiased comparison between the embeddings
from these algorithms, we use a dimension of 128 for each. For
other parameters, standard values that are either proposed by the
original papers or are approved parameter settings are used. While
this may lead to sub-optimal performances, we expect the attack
performance to only increase with optimized parameterization as
more information will be encoded in the embedding.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the results of our experiments. First, we
present key overall results on the performance of our attack ap-
proach on several different networks and embedding algorithms.
Then, we analyze the effect of network size, network density, and
node degree on the attack. Afterwards, we evaluate the sensitivity
to parameter choices in our approach. Finally, we investigate the
influence of instability in the embedding computations on the at-
tack and the variation of the main attack, described in Section 3.3,
which attempts to reduce the influence.
5.1 Main Results
To tackle our main research question, i.e., whether information
about the neighborhood of a removed node can be recovered us-
ing the vector representations of the other nodes, we evaluate the
4http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/facebook-wosn-links
5http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/petster-friendships-hamster
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Table 1: Performance of the attack on different networks
and algorithms. The attack extracts some information from
all embeddings on most networks. There is no embedding
algorithm the attack clearly performs best on.
Networks HOPE LINE node2vec SDNE
Barabasi AUC 0.63 0.83 0.72 0.61
precision@10 0.34 0.51 0.36 0.33
Macro-F1 0.16 0.4 0.19 0.16
Micro-F1 0.17 0.47 0.19 0.14
Facebook AUC 0.91 0.7 0.72 0.73
precision@10 0.6 0.45 0.41 0.42
Macro-F1 0.34 0.33 0.17 0.22
Micro-F1 0.29 0.2 0.2 0.15
Hamsterster AUC 0.83 0.69 0.66 0.72
precision@10 0.39 0.29 0.27 0.25
Macro-F1 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.18
Micro-F1 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.18
DBLP AUC 0.96 0.74 0.6 0.65
precision@10 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.07
Macro-F1 0.19 0.11 0.06 0.08
Micro-F1 0.21 0.12 0.05 0.06
attack on several different networks and embedding algorithms.
Our experimental results, see Table 1, show that the attack can re-
cover substantial information on the neighborhood of the removed
nodes with decent success on many networks from all evaluated
algorithms. While the recovered information is often not enough to
predict the neighbors accurately, the approach definitely recovers
good, partially excellent, candidates for neighbors of the removed
node as indicated by high AUC values of up to 0.96. This might, in
practical situations, already be enough to identify an individual.
There are also strong variations in the performance of the at-
tacks. In general, there is no embedding algorithm for which the
attack performs best over all networks. A possible explanation is
that different algorithms vary in behavior on different network
structures. On the regular structured Barabasi network, the attack
performs best on LINE, whereas on less regular structured networks
such as Facebook the attack performs best on HOPE. The better
performance on these embeddings may be due to less instability
in their computations, which makes the comparison between em-
beddings more consistent, see Section 5.4. The performance of the
attack varies with different networks, and even different measures
lead to varying conclusions. According to AUC, neighbors can be
predicted best in Facebook and DBLP. A substantial amount of cor-
rect predictions (according to precision@10 and the F1-scores) can
be achieved for the Barabasi, Facebook, and Hamsterster networks.
Overall, it is possible to extract substantial information, but only
seldom precise neighborhoods with all network embeddings, but
this is subject to strong variations. Hence, we next investigate the
effect of various conditions on the performance of the attack.
(a) Attack performance with varying network size
(b) Attack performance with varying density
Figure 3: Performance of the attack on networks generated
by the Barabasi-Albert model with different network sizes
and parameters of attachment (densities). Attack perfor-
mance declines with network size in a majority of cases. On
low density networks LINE and node2vec are more suscepti-
ble to attacks.
5.2 Impact of Structural Properties
Here, we evaluate the effect of network size and density on the
performance of the attack. We further investigate differences based
on the degree of the attacked node.
5.2.1 Network size. To evaluate the impact of network size on
attack performance, we generated Barabasi-Albert networks with
varying sizes and a fixed parameter of attachment of 5.
Our results (see Figure 3a) show that according to AUC, increas-
ing network size has a strong negative effect on the performance of
attacks on the LINE embedding, but little influence for attacks on
node2vec, HOPE, and SNDE. According to other evaluation criteria,
performance declines for all embeddings on larger networks. Keep-
ing vector representations at a fixed size might lead to decreased
performance since an increased amount of information must be cap-
tured in the same number of dimensions. Overall, making precise
predictions of the removed node’s neighbors gets more challenging
with increased network size. However, a set of candidates for such
neighbors can still be extracted from many embeddings.
5.2.2 Network density. Next, we analyze the effect of network den-
sity on attack performance. For that purpose, we generate multiple
networks with the Barabasi-Albert model with a fixed size of 1000
nodes, but varying attachment parameter.
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Table 2: Performance of the proposed attack on sets of nodes
with low, medium, and high degrees. The performance of
the attack is significantly better for nodes with higher de-
grees.
Barabasi Facebook Hamsterster DBLP
low med. high low med. high low med. high low med. high
H
O
PE
AUC 0.65 0.6 0.64 1 0.86 0.86 1 0.72 0.78 1 0.94 0.95
pr@10 0.04 0.4 0.58 0.12 0.84 0.84 0.1 0.57 0.5 0.06 0.1 0.32
Macro-F1 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.03 0.35 0.35 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.29
Micro-F1 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.36 0.34 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.21 0.32
LI
N
E AUC 0.71 0.89 0.89 0.7 0.67 0.72 0.61 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.76 0.79pr@10 0.04 0.59 0.89 0.08 0.63 0.65 0.04 0.5 0.34 0 0.32 0.09
Macro-F1 0.07 0.47 0.57 0.05 0.21 0.23 0.01 0.31 0.27 0.01 0.19 0.1
Micro-F1 0.07 0.48 0.57 0.04 0.21 0.23 0.01 0.3 0.27 0.01 0.19 0.11
no
de
2v
ec AUC 0.7 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.7 0.72 0.51 0.75 0.73 0.6 0.59 0.61
pr@10 0.08 0.4 0.61 0 0.62 0.6 0 0.49 0.33 0.02 0.14 0.07
Macro-F1 0.07 0.21 0.21 0 0.21 0.25 0 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.1 0.06
Micro-F1 0.06 0.21 0.21 0 0.21 0.25 0 0.28 0.28 0.01 0.1 0.05
SD
N
E AUC 0.64 0.59 0.6 0.77 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.76 0.72 0.6 0.71 0.65
pr@10 0.06 0.37 0.56 0.03 0.63 0.59 0 0.42 0.32 0 0.13 0.06
Macro-F1 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.19 0 0.23 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.08
Micro-F1 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.18 0.18 0 0.23 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.08
The results (see Figure 3b) indicate that LINE and node2vec are
substantially more susceptible to attacks for low-density networks
compared to the other algorithms according to all measures. This
might be due to the higher emphasis on the local neighborhood of
these embeddings. There is also a clear trend that the precision@10
increases for parameters of attachment > 5. This may be due to
quantitatively stronger differences between E and E ′ that result
from the removal of the node, but also just from the fact that there
are more positives in the data set.
5.2.3 Node degree. As described in Section 4, we sample attacked
nodes with low, medium, and high degrees. Differences between
the types of nodes are shown in Table 2. For the attacks on nodes
with a low degree, the data clearly shows that precision@10, Micro-
F1 and Macro-F1 are very low for all embedding algorithms and
networks. Thus, predicting neighbors of low degree nodes exactly
is overall very challenging. Note that AUC values vary between
very low and high values, probably due to the small number of pos-
itives in these cases. On the other hand, neighborhoods of medium
and high degree nodes can be predicted substantially better, reach-
ing precision@10 of over 0.8 on the Facebook network and 0.5
on Hamsterster. An explanation for this is that low degree nodes
usually have a smaller impact on the vector representations of their
neighbors.
5.3 Parameter Settings
This section presents experiments on the sensitivity to parameter
settings of the attack, i.e., the number of bins for training feature
construction, the number of training networks, and the selection
of the classifier. For space reasons, we limit the presented results to
two networks, namely the Barabasi and Facebook networks.
5.3.1 Number of bins. First, we evaluate the influence of the num-
ber of bins used for the computation of the training features. Fig-
ure 4a shows the performance of the attack over a range of different
numbers of bins. Overall, we see that the optimal number of bins
varies significantly depending on the dataset, the embedding algo-
rithm, and the measure used for evaluation. On both networks, the
AUC values are highest for low numbers of bins and decline slightly
with an increasing number of bins, probably due to over-fitting. In
contrast, according to precision and F1-scores, high values are to be
preferred specifically for the Barabasi network and the node2vec
and LINE embeddings, while low numbers of bins (of up to 20) are
better on the Facebook network and the HOPE embedding. We
conclude that, if desired, the number of bins can be fine-tuned to a
specific scenario depending on the concrete network and embed-
ding method.
5.3.2 Number of training networks. Next, we evaluate the effect of
the number of training networksG ′′ on the attack performance. In
general, higher numbers of networks provide more training data
but substantially increase the runtime since a separate embedding
must be trained for each network G ′′. Results, see Figure 4b, show
that using multiple training networks leads to better classifications,
but peak performance is reached at 5 training networks in most
cases. We have set the number of training networks used in the
other experiments accordingly. We expect a very slight increase in
performance for more training data, but at the cost of substantially
more computational efforts, see also Section 6.
5.3.3 Classification algorithms. Finally, we evaluate several clas-
sifiers for the attack. In particular, we evaluate K-nearest neighbor
classification, support vector machines, decision trees, random forests,
AdaBoost, and Gaussian naive Bayes classifiers. The outcomes vary
substantially, see the Appendix for detailed results. The overall
best performing and most consistent classifier is the Gaussian naive
Bayes classifier. Support vectormachines generally perform poorly.K-
nearest neighbor classification, decision trees, and random forests only
learn decently on the LINE embedding of the synthetic Barabasi
network and on HOPE embeddings of real-world networks. In these
cases, AdaBoost, which uses decision trees, performs comparably
to (and in some cases outperforms) the Bayesian classifier on all
evaluation criteria. For example, when embedding network Face-
book with HOPE, AdaBoost reaches a precision@10 of 0.73 and the
Bayesian classifier of 0.6. Using other embedding methods and net-
works, AdaBoost achieves comparable, often better, performances
according to AUC, but worse according to other evaluation criteria.
E.g., when embedding network Hamsterster with LINE, AdaBoost
reaches an AUC of 0.75 but a precision@10 of only 0.1 and a Micro-
F1 score of almost 0 while the Bayesian classifier reaches an AUC
of 0.6, precision@10 of 0.29 and a Micro-F1 score of 0.24. Thus,
we use the Gaussian naive Bayes classifier as a consistent choice
in the other experiments for this paper, but again see options for
fine-tuning a particular attack.
5.4 Instability in Embedding Algorithms
As explained in Section 3.3, random effects in embedding computa-
tions influence the performance of the attack. We evaluate these
influences and the described variation to the attack to reduce them.
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(a) Attack performance for different number of bins for feature construction
(b) Attack performance with different numbers of training networks (G′′)
Figure 4: Parameter sensitivity of attack performance. We investigate attacks with different numbers of bins, for feature con-
struction, and training networks (G ′′), to generate training data, on the Barabasi network (top rows) and the Facebook network
(bottom rows). The optimum number of bins varies with embeddings, networks, and evaluation criteria. More training data
improves the performance of the attack, but mostly plateaus between 5 and 10 networks.
To analyze the influence of instabilities, we reduce this influence
by averaging for each network over distance matrices computed
from multiple embeddings on that network. The resulting aver-
age distance matrices are used like normal distance matrices in
the main approach. Figure 5a shows the performance of the attack
using different numbers of embeddings per network on embed-
ding algorithms LINE and node2vec and networks Barabasi and
Facebook. The performance of the attack increases with decreasing
influence of random effects (i.e., more embeddings per network).
For Barabasi the performance increase on embedding LINE stag-
nates at about 10 embeddings per network, but further increases
on node2vec. The attacks on Facebook also benefit greatly. This
supports the hypothesis that the instabilities in the computation
of the embeddings are a major limiting factor for the performance
of the attack. Overcoming this would significantly improve the
performance.
Variation. Section 3.3 describes an attempt to reduce the influence
of these effects on our attack approach. Experimental evaluation of
this approach (see Figure 5b) shows that this approach in its basic
form does not improve attack performance. A likely problem is that
the employed measure for embedding similarity is insufficient. We
can even observe that in some cases worse embeddings are chosen,
as the performance decreases with more embeddings per network.
Future research in that direction is warranted.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the implications of the findings and
evaluate limitations of the approach.
6.1 Implications
Our results show that after removing a node from a network and
its respective vector representation from the network embedding,
substantial information on the neighborhood of this node remains
in the embedding. Even though the exact neighbors cannot be
recovered reliably, several “likely friends” can often be found. This
might be enough in many scenarios to identify the person behind
the removed node. Further, this can lead to the revelation of critical
private information, such as political or religious affiliation [11, 16].
Potentially, this can have crucial implications: Assume, for ex-
ample, that a repressive governance entity foreign to the social
network maintainer successfully obtains a snapshot of the network
and an embedding illegally. It could then identify an individual by
recovering some of his friends. At the same time, another recov-
ered edge in the network could show contact to another network
node, which represents a political dissident. In this case, the failure
of erasing the full information of a node to be deleted in the net-
work embedding could lead to strong real-life ramifications such
as political persecution.
This has consequences for the usage of network embeddings in
the context of a typical social network scenario. Whenever a user
demands the deletion of his network information, it is not sufficient
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(a) Average over distance matrices from multiple embeddings per network
(b) Variation of the attack using different numbers of embeddings on available networks (G′ and G′′).
Figure 5: Influence of random factors in the embedding calculations and performance of the variation on networks Barabasi
(top rows) and Facebook (bottom rows). We reduce the influence of random effects in embedding computations by averaging
pairwise node distances over multiple embeddings per network. Fewer random effects increase the attack performance signif-
icantly (a). A variation to the approach, which computes multiple embeddings on available networks (G ′ and G ′′) and selects
the most similar to the attacked embedding, does not yield significant improvements (b).
to remove the corresponding node from the network and the cor-
responding vector representation of that node from embeddings
trained on the network to fully protect her privacy. To ensure that
all his data is removed, retraining or at least modification of the
remaining embeddings is required. This can be computationally
expensive and has to be repeated whenever any user deletes his
account. Even if this measure might be technically simple to accom-
plish, it might be computationally costly. Moreover, the platform
must explicitly be aware of this potential privacy issue. In that
direction, our paper raises awareness of possible privacy concerns
in the context of non-updated network embeddings.
With the increasing importance of data ownership and data pro-
tection, our results might also have legal implications: As the GDPR
establishes a right to erasure, on a person’s request a company is
legally required to remove all personal data. This includes data that
can lead to the identification of that person and should – by the
results of this work – also involve network embeddings.
6.2 Limitations
We see our work as a first step in the analysis of privacy attacks on
embeddings that is still restricted in multiple ways:
As described above, due to resource limitations we only evaluate
the attack on relatively small networks. The attack can, however,
be parallelized and thus scales well with increased computational
resources, enabling application also to larger networks. Also, a pri-
vacy attack can be a one-time effort, while the platform maintainer
would be required to recompute network embeddings on a regular
basis. Additionally, small and specialized social networks are also
heavily used in many domains, and those small networks might be
specifically vulnerable to security attacks.
We only evaluated the performance on connected networks,
while many real-world (especially social) networks consist of mul-
tiple components. The attack may work for such networks by ana-
lyzing each component separately as long as the removed node did
not connect components. Also, to establish that information is pre-
served, it was sufficient to only look at one removed node at a time.
In real-world scenarios, the deletion of multiple nodes may be com-
mon, making a successful attack more challenging. Our approach
can be extended to that scenario in the future, e.g., by applying
the proposed method repeatedly. Additionally, we assume that the
attack algorithm knows the applied embedding algorithm and its
parameterization. While this is a strong assumption, it appears to
be plausible either through security leaks, published research, or an
open source implementation of the online social network. Limiting
this assumption will be another interesting direction for future
research.
Our approach recovers network information with high, but far
from perfect accuracy. Yet, combining its results with other sources
might provide legally critical information on individuals. While we
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expect that our experimental results could be further improved by
optimizations, we do not expect that a full recovery of the network
structure is plausible given that each embedding always represents
only a lossy compression of the original network. In our experi-
ments, we see strong variances in the susceptibility of embeddings
to privacy attacks. An interesting open question is if this correlates
with the performance of the embeddings on other tasks. We see
these open issues as promising directions for future research.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We studied the susceptibility of social network embeddings to pri-
vacy attacks. We asked if it is sufficient to remove a node from
a network and the corresponding vector representation from the
embedding trained on this network to delete personal informa-
tion on that node, specifically if the neighborhood of the removed
node can be recovered with information encoded in the embedding
vectors of the remaining nodes. For that purpose, we deployed an
attack based on differences between node distances in network
embeddings and a machine learning classifier. Our experimental
results demonstrate that substantial information about the edges
of a removed node/user can be retrieved across many different
datasets. We also present insights into which kind of nodes are
particularly susceptible to these kinds of attacks and find that high
degree nodes are at particular risk. Our results suggest that deleting
the corresponding vector representation from network embeddings
alone is not a sufficient measure from a privacy perspective.
In future work, we will focus on the scalability of the attack
approach, on the transfer to directed, weighted, or attributed net-
works, and on attacks on networks with multiple nodes removed.
Further, we will study which modifications to network embeddings
can provide a reliable defense against such attacks.
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A APPENDIX
Table 3 provides detailed results for the performance of the proposed
attack with different classification algorithms.
Table 3: Performance of the proposed attackwith different classification algorithms (KNN =K-nearest neighbour classification,
SVC = support vectormachines, DT = decision trees, RF = random forests, AB =AdaBoost, GNB =Gaussian naive bayes classifiers)
on four datasets.
Barabasi Facebook
Embedding Algorithm KNN SVC DT RF AB GNB KNN SVC DT RF AB GNB
HOPE avg auc 0.52 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.78 0.89 0.67 0.86 0.95 0.91
precision@10 0.0 0.0 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.34 0.74 0.0 0.58 0.7 0.73 0.6
macro f1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.16 0.48 0.0 0.43 0.44 0.5 0.34
micro f1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.01 0.0 0.17 0.26 0.0 0.4 0.25 0.32 0.29
LINE avg auc 0.64 0.55 0.57 0.69 0.81 0.83 0.58 0.48 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.7
precision@10 0.5 0.0 0.37 0.55 0.59 0.51 0.24 0.0 0.13 0.07 0.2 0.45
macro f1 0.14 0.0 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.33
micro f1 0.22 0.0 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.47 0.01 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.01 0.2
node2vec avg auc 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.6 0.78 0.72 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.79 0.72
precision@10 0.2 0.0 0.22 0.2 0.43 0.36 0.06 0.0 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.41
macro f1 0.01 0.0 0.1 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.17
micro f1 0.02 0.0 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.0 0.0 0.06 0.0 0.0 0.2
SDNE avg auc 0.52 0.46 0.5 0.54 0.6 0.61 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.56 0.71 0.73
precision@10 0.04 0.0 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.33 0.11 0.0 0.13 0.09 0.2 0.42
macro f1 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.16 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.01 0.22
micro f1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.14 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.15
Hamsterster DBLP
Embedding Algorithm KNN SVC DT RF AB GNB KNN SVC DT RF AB GNB
HOPE avg auc 0.68 0.64 0.62 0.74 0.9 0.83 0.63 0.95 0.65 0.75 0.95 0.96
precision@10 0.42 0.0 0.41 0.59 0.48 0.39 0.22 0.0 0.29 0.2 0.23 0.16
macro f1 0.22 0.0 0.31 0.41 0.39 0.19 0.07 0.0 0.29 0.03 0.18 0.19
micro f1 0.04 0.0 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.0 0.15 0.02 0.1 0.21
LINE avg auc 0.55 0.6 0.52 0.58 0.75 0.69 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.66 0.74
precision@10 0.01 0.0 0.16 0.05 0.1 0.29 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.14
macro f1 0.0 0.0 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.23 0.0 0.0 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.11
micro f1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.24 0.0 0.0 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.12
node2vec avg auc 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.71 0.66 0.5 0.51 0.5 0.52 0.57 0.6
precision@10 0.0 0.0 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.03 0.0 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08
macro f1 0.0 0.0 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.19 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.06
micro f1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.22 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.01 0.05
SDNE avg auc 0.52 0.53 0.5 0.57 0.73 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.59 0.65
precision@10 0.04 0.0 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.0 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.03 0.07
macro f1 0.0 0.0 0.03 0.0 0.01 0.18 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.0 0.06 0.08
micro f1 0.01 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.18 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.02 0.06
10
